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     Christian Realism and Augustinian (?) Liberalism 
 Surely there is enough kindling lying about in the Bible and in subsequent moral theology to fire 
up love for neighbors and compassion for countless “friends” in foreign parts--and in crisis.  And, surely, 
the momentum of love’s labor for the just redistribution of resources, fueled by activists’ appeals for 
solidarity, should be sustained by stressing that we are creatures made for affection, not for aggression. 
Yet experience, plus the history of the Christian traditions, taught Reinhold Niebuhr, who memorably 
reminded Christian realists, how often love was “defeated,” how a “strategy of brotherhood . . . 
degenerates from mutuality to a prudent regard for the interests of self and from an impulse towards 
community to an acceptance of the survival impulse as ethically normative” (Niebuhr 1964, 2:96). 
 But he was encouraged after reading Augustine. The late antique African bishop nudged 
Niebuhr to look for the “formula for leavening the city of this world with the love of the city of God” 
(Niebuhr 1953, 134).  The authors of the books before us are still looking. They concede, as did Niebuhr, 
that Augustine’s monumental City of God explicitly sets limits on love’s effectiveness on the practice of 
politics.  They refuse, nonetheless, as did Niebuhr, to offer any “blanket judgments about the power of 
the state,” although they acknowledge that politics tends to trick practitioners to overlook limits and to 
become “idolatrous[ly]” infatuated with what governments can do (Lovin 1995, 180-84; Lovin 2008, 198-
99). 
 Augustine did indulge in blanket judgments. I shall contend that he yanked his comprehensive 
condemnation wholly over bed and body politic. True, the contention is controversial, though few 
historians would dispute that, by the early fifth century, he had swapped whatever was left of his 
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political optimism for much lower estimates of what his faith could contribute to political deliberations. 
Why? Rome’s military setbacks across the Mediterranean as well as rivalries and insurrections in Africa 
may account for his disenchantment. Almost certainly, his general sense of humanity’s “fallen” condition 
contributed.  The most conspicuous sign of the damage from that fall, concupiscence, was a pervasive, 
inordinate desire for worldly possessions and for position. Christianity’s harping on the impermanence 
of wealth, social advantage, and domination seemed to have little effect, yet Augustine kept to that 
course. Still, he believed that while their faith helped Christians offload guilt, nothing could undo what 
the first sin of humanity’s parents and their fall from grace had done. Non posse non peccare; the 
faithful were unable to behave impeccably. 
 Pessimism pegged to such observations and the observations themselves are seldom welcome. 
Early fifth-century idealists, notably the Pelagians and Donatists got shirty with Augustine who scolded 
them for being naively perfectionist. One finds that his and Niebuhr’s anti-utopian imperatives still play 
today. For their part, Christian realists have been known to trot out the two, assuming that neither 
meant his emphasis on the pervasive and--for Augustine--a providential presence of evil to lead to moral 
paralysis. With help, good could come from evil, not in the form of political settlements, Augustine 
surmised, but as personal sentiments, that is, as promising shoots sprouting from the ruins of a fallen 
nature. We grow compassion.  For that reason, “in the face of a massive and persistent presence of evil 
in the world,” Charles Mathewes notes, “we continue to insist that the basic truth about the world is its 
goodness . . . if not its justice, at least its basalt worthiness and inherent value.”  That phrase, “if not its 
justice,” appears to me to be a telling disclaimer; in effect--if not also in intent--it puts politics beyond 
the pale, and it acknowledges that Augustine considered combat against corruption to be first and 
foremost intrapsychic. The objective was not to reform government or rehabilitate “the state” but to 
win over the soul--not to sift political malpractice but to correct the “sinful misdisposition of our will 
articulated in our habits” (Mathewes 2001, 70-74). 
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 Niebuhr’s Christian realism seems less severe and more inclined to harbor hopes for 
“progressive justice.” Geoffrey Rees attributes Niebuhr’s spiffed-up Augustinianism to his “rejection of 
any literalistic interpretation of original sin” (Rees 2003, 88-91). The notion that the disobedience of Eve 
and Adam left an indelible stain on human character was useful in Augustine’s campaigns against 
alleged Pelagian perfectionism, yet original sin precludes neither moral improvement nor the possibility 
that moral progress could have meaningful political effects. Still, Augustine had little confidence in 
Roman leadership--imperial, regional, and municipal. He concluded that an eerily irrepressible ambition 
or desire to dominate drove all political practice. He occasionally wrote as if government might surprise 
him.  He noticed the odd civic official who did not dive like a cormorant into the corridors of power. He 
awarded Emperor Theodosius high marks for prudence and piety (Augustine 1972, 221-22: 5.26). Hence, 
it is not inconceivable that Augustine, without thinking that vera justitia, “genuine justice,” was possible 
this side of the grave (74-75: 2.21), could still have hoped for “progressive justice,” as did Niebuhr when 
he departed the slums of industrial Detroit for New York, where he studied the surges of Christian 
realism in the early fifth century and drafted a “definition of ‘realism’ [that] implies that idealists are 
subject to illusions about social realities, which,” he added, “indeed they are” (Niebuhr 1953, 119). 
 
 Augustine had plenty of chances to see scoundrels around him at work in government in Italy 
and Africa. He read Livy’s accounts of ambition and was familiar with Sallust’s brooding over corruption. 
He was under no illusions about social realities (Harding 2008, 47-83; Kaufman 2007, 115-18). Christians 
were pilgrims or resident aliens this side of the grave. The nineteenth chapter of Augustine’s City of God 
suggests the tensions they experience when they try to be of service where they find themselves.1 
 Gerald Schlabach reads the City’s recommendations as an argument for “Augustinian 
continence,” by which he means the “evangelical self-denial” that inspires profound, mutual caring 
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among Christians ( Schlabach 2001, 87). His core assertion is that such love far exceeds benevolence, 
but, elaborating, Schlabach mostly manages lots of nots: “caritas-working-through-continence” is not 
domineering, not acquisitive, not manipulative (73-75, 90-91). The difficulty is that Augustine did resort 
to manipulation and coercion while attempting to take over or, in places, to take back basilicas from 
Donatist Christians.  Schlabach concedes that, “arguably, the effort was an act of incontinence,” 
acknowledging that his subject was “grasping domineeringly for a good [the reunification of African 
Christianity and creation of “an order of mutual love”] that Christians must receive rather as a gift” 
(166). Schlabach is not alone, as we shall see; others, looking for love and liberalism in Augustine’s 
career, are tormented by evidence that he sanctioned the use of intimidation to bring clerical and lay 
members of the pars Donati into the supra-regional church from which their forerunners seceded a 
century earlier.  The secessionists’ bishops were unworldly. Less well traveled than their rivals--
Augustine’s episcopal colleagues--they claimed a superior righteousness, even as their provincialism 
made their sense of superiority and century-long defiance of imperial and church leadership seem 
ludicrous to more refined Christians. We return to Donatism shortly, because Augustine’s efforts to 
suppress it and the sometimes surly disposition he showed in defending them make it particularly hard 
for Augustinian liberals to chauffer him into their camp.  At the moment, we need only note what 
Schlabach describes as “an almost Donatist clarity of vision,” which seems to inform Augustine’s 
understanding of how continence, love, and patience should work within the church.  Schlabach has his 
man flirt with the perfectionism he so criticized.  Yet, within a few pages, Schlabach repents having 
Augustine package the charms of church life too attractively, restoring the “ongoing tension” in 
Augustine’s ecclesiology. Life as it is in churches, families, and political institutions is not as it ought to 
be (116-18). 
 Whereas Schlabach concentrates on inspiring caregivers and compassion in churches, Robert 
Dodaro’s study of a love that practices patience and politics bears more directly on the interests of 
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current Christian realists and Augustinian liberals who write to chauffer their favorite bishop into their 
camp. In Dodaro’s Christ and the Just Society in the thought of Augustine, a closely argued but 
wonderfully readable book, readers can eavesdrop as the late antique prelate counsels Christian 
statesmen. The title gives away the general content of such counsel--that Augustine made direct 
connections between virtues commended in the gospels and the kind of political engagement that 
should make a government progressively more just and, finally, genuinely just. [You need a transition 
marker here between your views and your overview of the problems in trying to co-opt Augustine 
into one political perspective or another and your consideration of the 4 books. I was confused. ] 
 Dodaro is an excellent historical theologian, too good to overlook those anti-utopian 
“imperatives” in Augustine’s correspondence and in the polemical treatises against perfectionism, to 
which we have already alluded, yet he locates a cautious, rather obscurely coded optimism in the City of 
God, despite that text’s declarations positioning terrestrial cities far from vera justitia, true or genuine 
justice. Justice of that sort requires that all receive their due, but, with everyone angling for advantage 
in this wicked world, God gets shortchanged. Fallen human nature stubbornly refuses to give God 
divinity’s due, reverence expressed liturgically and in self-denying love (Augustine 1972, 882: 19.21).  
One result, that political practice becomes hostage to practitioners’ desire to dominate, means that the 
servitude of some to others is unavoidable.  Where can Christ be linked with a just society, then, save in 
Dodaro’s title?  Schlbach’s reply is the church; Dodaro’s answer, the virtuous intentions of faithful, 
humble statesmen who accept Jesus Christ as the impresario of their souls’ “efforts to overcome 
obstacles to the true knowledge and worship of God,” efforts that become preconditions for the 
“creation and preservation of a just society” (Dodaro 2004, 31). 
 The creation and preservation of a genuinely just society? Before the hereafter? Was Augustine 
striving towards that end?  Dodaro elsewhere collects evidence of the bishop’s political “activism” in a 
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tidy, small heap, composed chiefly of advice offered public officials, yet Augustine comes across as a 
man without a plan.  No consistently proposed and argued public policy surfaces. Indeed, as Dodaro 
admits, Augustine’s “activity responds to particular social ills as they arose among the people for whose 
pastoral care he feels responsible.” He was not programmatically political, but he understood that he 
was pastorally responsible for statesmen who were--and who, Dodaro tells us, were attracted by two 
types of heroism (Dodaro 2005, 110-11). 
 The first was conventional. Romans’ heroes sought glory and popularity in this life and only 
secondarily, if at all, valued God’s approval now and reward later (Augustine 1972, 203: 5.14). The 
second was apostolic, the heroism countenanced by Christianity’s first apostles. It placed pleasing God 
above all else (Dodaro 2004, 53).  Chiding leaders for their attachments to conventional concepts of the 
heroic, Augustine, according to Dodaro, bent every effort to increase the appeal of the apostolic.  
Celebrated public servants’ popularity occasionally survived their deaths, Augustine said, but popularity 
was a “surrogate immortality.” And celebrity, obsessively pursued, as it often was, kept would-be heroes 
from pursuing “true piety and the happiness it imparts.” Assurances that they were--and would forever 
be--citizens of the celestial city compensated the Christian statesmen for the know-nothing crowds’ 
adulation. True, Rome’s poets had said otherwise. But Augustine charged that the immortality they 
packaged as fame was a scam. He set heroism and immortality in a scriptural context, defining both as 
God’s gifts. So says Dodaro, and he is right. Statesmen receiving such gifts become known by “public 
acknowledgment of the limits of their virtue through prayer” and, simultaneously, “by means of this 
prayer,” piety purifies the intention behind other virtues, such as justice, with the result that these, too, 
are rendered true” (57). 
 Dodaro stations “true” justice somewhere between intention and realization, implying that the 
latter, politically, is within reach. But his book’s brilliance, to my eyes, shows best in its anatomy of the 
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former--intention. Dodaro probes Augustine’s interests in statesmen’s motives, interests that appear to 
me predominantly pastoral rather than political. Political endeavor and apology have pastoral 
dimensions, Charles Mathewes points out, citing Lincoln’s second inaugural address and the insights 
bracing it (as the “cultivation of the holy terror that is integral to true piety”).  Mathewes has the “public 
sphere become . . . the forum for an ascetical inquiry,” which, in turn, “better shapes” officeholders 
“more fully to receive God’s grace” (Mathewes 2007, 259-60). Dodaro’s Augustine tried something a bit 
different. He deployed a series of contrasts beginning with two distinctive kinds of heroism then peeling 
back to the different intimations of immortality each implied and to the reigning reactions to mortality. 
Fortitude trumped faith in the ways Rome’s statesmen faced death, because they had been beguiled by 
their poets.  Recent military and political humiliations had gone some distance towards sobering up 
citizens, yet those resenting the new faith and envying its growing influence blamed Christianity for their 
empire’s setbacks.  The first ten books of Augustine’s City of God record his answer.  Dodaro revisits 
their rehearsal of the failures of Rome’s religions and philosophies to “offer efficacious solutions to the 
fear of death.”  Augustine to the rescue: he supplied new “solutions,” among them, an authentic, 
Christian immortality (as opposed to a surrogate, pagan immortality) “in tandem with the rejection of 
the value of the examples of virtue offered by Rome’s most outstanding citizens.” Death, Dodaro adds, 
“is truly defeated only when the soul desires God over all other goods” and when that desire lays at the 
foundation of a Christianized concept of civic virtue. The City of God becomes that concept’s showcase. 
Therein, old ideas about heroism and public service “are redefined and transformed in a Christian key, 
thus redefining the just society itself” (35-36).  
 What might “the just society itself” have looked like in the Christian statesmen’s intentions? 
Dodaro suggests that it could have crystallized as devout politicians’ urges to translate “the penitential 
qualities of their faith’s saints” into civic virtues.  Augustine, he surmises, would have hoped so.  The 
bishop believed that Rome’s old ideas about honor and glory, which had shaped “political discourses,” 
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were ripe for replacement. Their function as counters to the statesmen’s fear of death had been 
undermined by Christianity. They were obsolete. Their place could be reserved for the new faith and 
“the penitential qualities” if its saints (183). 
 Dodaro explains how this substitution and transformation might have worked--if not in political 
practice, at least in Augustine’s political thought. The “technology” was dependent on repentance. 
Statesmen’s sorrow for their sins was “the experiential basis from which to generate sympathy for 
others.”  Sorrow built solidarity, initially the faithful statesman’s solidarity with fallen humanity.  King 
David and the apostle Peter were the models; agonizing over their sins, they became better rulers (201-
202). Politics became, for Dodaro’s Augustine, a public penance. He reinvented “the state.” He knew no 
ruler could get that completely right; he was too much a Christian realist, Dodaro admits, to hope for a 
perfectly virtuous leader. But he was no pessimist.  He saved statesmen from the “surrogate 
immortality” that had long informed political practice, scolded them for sin, mentioned their mortality 
to inspire them and save them from a “second,” eternal death, preached repentance to them, and led 
them to live “under a divine pardon.” For their part, they then governed mercifully and justly (212). 
 No easy task. Rulers must first learn then teach “truths that are shrouded in the darkness of 
mystery and within a depth of wisdom that is hidden from reason.”  They must compellingly present 
“the spiritual arts of penitence.” Dodaro’s Augustine grows optimistic as the pages turn.  At least, 
Dodaro seems to grow more optimistic--and less realistic--for his subject.  Augustine is said to have 
dreamed of high-minded authorities, “their attention fixed on the heavenly city,” nonetheless 
promoting the civic virtues of citizens whom they draw “away from concern with the illusory 
achievement of moral and spiritual autonomy and towards the freedom to live interiorly as citizens in 
God’s city” (218). Dodaro concludes with that crescendo.  But the passage from the rulers’ probity and 
citizens’ interiority to “the creation and preservation of a just society,” arguably, looked more difficult 
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to Augustine [elaborate a bit more?] (Kaufman 2007, 228-30).  There is no denying, however, that 
Dodaro’s scalpel has given us a good look at Augustine’s anatomy of statesmen’s intentions--at what he 
thought they had been as well as at what he hoped they might become. Christian realists may object to 
that last bit, but Dodaro will challenge them to reconsider their paladin’s views on political virtue. No 
denying also that Dodaro has stitched up an Augustine who will prove quite useful to Augustinian 
liberals, who, as one of their cleverest, philosophically well-informed, and articulate new recruits says, 
believe that their man was devoted to placing “hopeful pressures . . . on all politics” (Gregory 2008, 
361). 
 Eric Gregory’s marvelous book, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of 
Democratic Citizenship, rakes Augustine’s many remarks on, and exhortations to, love into suggestive 
discussions of civic virtue.  When Christian realists comment on the mischief that passes as politics and 
on establishment values spiked with dollops of American exceptionalism, they tend to recall Augustine’s 
stress on sin and self-interest.  If liberals looking to rehabilitate political practices relish what Augustine 
wrote about love, they have a feast in Gregory’s expositions, which start, as Dodaro did, with the 
restructuring of desire: “Love must be trained” (262). Once trained, freshly and highly motivated rulers 
and citizens pore over the conundrums related to governing, which sometimes stump Christian realists, 
and register new solutions.  Gregory can be rather hard on those stumped, saddened realists who are, 
he avers, disposed to “denigrate the social functions of non-ecclesiastical communities that aspire to 
justice” and who forget that love is as formidable as sin--indeed, more formidable--in political theology. 
Christian realists, that is, do not see how the ordo amoris at the center of  Augustine’s “true political 
theology” can become an extraordinary resource for developing “an ethic of citizenship” and civic virtue 
(136-38). 
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 Politics and the Order of Love does exactly what its title promises; it couples the two, infusing 
the former with the latter.  And Gregory infuses the whole with a sense of urgency. “The time has 
come,” he says, “to put Augustinian liberalism more explicitly within its proper context of critical 
admiration of liberal virtues and the aspirations of perfection rather than one of relentless negation” 
(32). With little evidence, however, Gregory is absolutely certain that Augustine shared his urgency, that 
the late antique bishop “was consumed with the task of responding to the allegation” that Christianity 
undermined public order (59). “Consumed”? Augustine more often seems composed than consumed. 
He as much as conceded some incompatibility between that “true” theology and politics when he 
explained that the virtues prescribed by Christianity’s sacred texts, “forbearance and benevolence, 
should be kept secretly in one’s own mind” as one--say a Christian who acquiesces to become a 
magistrate--upholds a judgment that requires retribution as well as reparations (Augustine 2001, 37: 
epistle 138.13). 
 But Gregory is not just troubled by realists’ “relentless negation[s].” He is equally upset by 
secular liberals’ efforts to close the road “from religious convictions to political commitments” (Gregory 
2008, 61). Perhaps the most celebrated, John Rawls, affixes to some of his appeals to “public reason” 
prohibitions against letting religious faiths that, by definition, are comprehensive and exclusive into the 
public forum. Such faiths, he argues, cultivate a “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics,” quite 
contrary to the survival of “an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship” (Rawls 
1997, 766-67). Appeals to public reason foster reciprocity; appeals to faith have been known to 
promote “political virtues found in political liberalism” (794), though religious faith has been known--
too often for Rawls--to torpedo “the principle of toleration” so basic to every liberal, constitutional 
regime. Piety in power is pernicious. It depreciates the liberties of the religiously indifferent and of any 
who appear religiously different--or deviant (782-83). Rawls therefore consigns debates between 
comprehensive religious doctrines to a “background culture”--to an obscurity that, Gregory complains, 
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would effectively proscribe “Christian political advocacy” and thus “domesticate” religion’s “prophetic 
witness” (Gregory 2008, 65).  Close the road from religious convictions to political commitment, and you 
close an artery through which compassion flows into political deliberations. Love empowers justice; 
Augustinian liberalism inspires love. So, should Rawlsian liberals succeed restricting religious speech in 
public life, their liberal societies would--near fatally--neglect “the need to replenish the moral energies 
that sustain liberalism” (66). 
 Gregory assembles a small army to punch that point home in his second and third chapters.  
Objections to dour Christian realists and secularizing Rawlsians billow from those pages. Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, Timothy Jackson, Rowan Williams, Joan Tronto, Charles Mathewes, Oliver O’Donovan, and 
Susan Okin, among others, assist Gregory in making the claim that Augustinian liberalism is vital to the 
“moral conversation about politics,” which, in turn, is vital to political liberalism (148). 
 Then he tackles Hannah Arendt. For much of the mid-section of Gregory’s book, Arendt is his 
prime target. Her interpretation of the concept of love in Augustine’s work, which makes her exquisite 
doctoral dissertation still worth reading, seems to have had a profound effect on the opinions she later 
formulated about modernity, forgiveness, and civic responsibility.  Gregory, following Mathewes and 
Elshtain, intriguingly intimates that Arendt’s confrontations with totalitarianism bear comparison with 
Augustine’s face-offs with imperialism and that his “mature” anti-Manichaean reconceptualization of 
evil (as deficit) is somewhat analogous to her controversial remarks about “the banality of evil” in the 
twentieth century (198-99).  What disappoints Gregory is Arendt’s depoliticization of Augustine’s ordo 
amoris.  She subscribes to interpretations that distinguish between cupiditas and caritas and that make 
it difficult to find a place for the love of neighbor in his thinking because caritas turns wholeheartedly to 
eternity.  Arendt’s Augustine, in effect, “obscures the relevance of the neighbor” (233). The title of 
Gregory’s fourth chapter, “Love as Political Vice,” gives his displeasure away, although he sees that 
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Augustine’s understanding of love, filtered through Arendt, is really less vicious than vacuous. When she 
finished with her subject, Christian love was so theocentric that “civic virtue” was left undersourced. 
Love was “worldless”; “rather than providing a founding principle for politics, [it] turn[ed] out finally to 
prevent politics” (217). 
 The doctrine of the Incarnation, the union of divine and human natures in Jesus Christ, Gregory 
imagines, kept Augustine from Arendt’s conclusions.  The love for God was love for all neighbors, 
collected, one might say, in the savior. Yet, Gregory claims, Arendt let neo-Platonism colonize 
Augustine’s Christology so that “the Incarnation . . . serves as a distraction from attending to the other in 
his or her alterity.” And “Christ as the divine neighbor absorbs the integrity of all neighbor love” (223).  
Arendt allegedly quizzed her own conclusions and tried to correct for this “absorption,” which, Gregory 
says, “prevents politics,” but she was unsuccessful. Her attempts left him unappeased. At her 
dissertation’s end, “genuine neighbor-love,” for Arendt’s Augustine, “consists in drawing the neighbor 
into the stream of God’s love” (337); “the concrete horizontal encounter with the neighbor is always 
only mediated, and finally deferred, to the vertical relation to God” (222). 
 Gregory dislikes “deferrals” of this sort and supposes that Augustine would as well. But it is (and 
was?) only one of the two more egregious kinds of “escapism” that could curb plans in the fourth, fifth, 
and twenty-first centuries to “operationalize” love “as a political virtue” (298). Making “worldless” love 
superior to affections lavished on beloved friends is one danger. Another makes love too worldly, 
whereupon spectacles obscure genuine compassion (282). Gregory illustrates that second danger with a 
story from the fourth book of Augustine’s Confessions in which the narrator records his alarm at the 
grief he expressed on learning of a friend’s death. He mourned theatrically and learned later, according 
to Arendt, that his friendship and extravagant mourning had fettered him to the things of this world. 
The lesson was an emancipation enabling him, Arendt says--and Gregory disapprovingly repeats--“to 
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make a desert out of the world and to protect his love for God.” Gregory prefers to think that 
Augustine’s distress was due to the ease with which “loving love . . . eclipse[d] the particularism of love” 
(285). 
 He appreciates that “the particularism of love” can be problematic. With clues from colleagues 
Rowan Williams and Oliver O’Donovan, he looks for “a more nuanced mediation between the universal 
and particular.” And he learns that, as love becomes politically “operationalized,” it “continually expands 
the circle of neighborly concern.” Gregory infers that Augustine intended his distinctively Christian 
version of friendship to “extend the possibilities of virtue beyond a philosophical elite” and right into the 
public forum where “an Augustinian ethic of democratic citizenship”--Gregory’s subtitle--can “both 
democratize . . .  and publicize . . . love through a theological (and political) populism” (353-55).  Did 
Augustine do the democratizing? Or is Gregory responsible for the transitions, from love through power 
to justice, to “the creation and preservation of a just society”? The great virtue of Gregory’s book, I 
think, is that it positions Augustine’s ordo amoris quite usefully in contemporary political discourse. But 
Gregory appears to award Augustine too much of the credit for what he, Dodaro, and other 
“Augustinian liberals” achieve, “plac[ing] the emotions squarely in the context of morality itself” and 
“plac[ing] morality at the center of political theology” (291).  And there, at that center, the moral, 
political, theological injunction to advance the interests of the weak before those of the strong acquires 
considerable influence, supported by the liberals’ reading of the gospels and their reconstructions of a 
“collectivist Christology” that Augustine purportedly promoted on the basis of Christ’s enduring 
presence in or to humanity, especially to “the least of these my brethren” (348-49, citing Matthew 
25:40). 
 Gregory’s book draws a few practical, political implications. The aforesaid injunction, for 
example, might “guide practical deliberations in agenda setting for scarce resources” (296).  One can 
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imagine Obama’s Augustinian liberals coupling discussions of distributive justice with talk of universal 
health care coverage.  Likely, Christian realists, to some extent setting aside Augustine’s emphasis on 
personal or political fallibility and marinating plans for progressive justice, could usefully deploy 
Augustine’s endorsements--in his Confessions, correspondence, and sermons--of a “Gregorian” “love 
that sees real others,” endorsements that, amplified in Gregory’s study, seem to me to have settled on 
the frontiers of utopia. For Gregory, however, those endorsements are sum and substance of a “morally 
robust Augustinian civic liberalism” and an Augustinian “populism,” to boot (298).2 
 Of course, the terms “liberalism” and “populism” are hard to parse under the best 
circumstances, which seldom include peering from the present into the remote past. Can we call 
Augustine a populist? Conrad Leyser, the first named of Gregory’s “many recent interpreters” who 
“emphasize the populist implications of Augustine’s theology” (355), does maintain that the bishop, 
while preaching on the relationships between monasticism and the church, tried “to avoid the 
appearance . . . of spiritual elitism” (Leyser 2000, 12-13). Yet at no point, does Leyser say that abbots or 
bishops (or Augustine) prodded or should have prodded municipal, regional, and imperial officials to be 
more egalitarian and, therefore, more just. When Leyser finds Augustine reflecting on questions of 
community and authority, in semi-retirement, he “confirmed rather than altered his basic premises.  
Disillusion with the monastic community in the saeculum,” as Leyser would have it, appears “to have 
made still more sharply focused his vision of the eschatological community of the elect and still more 
attenuated his estimation of what those in power in the saeculum could knowingly achieve” (26).  That 
sounds right to me, and it will bear repeating. For Augustine’s City of God and anti-pelagian treatises 
leave the impression that, from 410, he grew increasingly skeptical about what people and political 
systems might achieve. Indeed, one could argue that Augustine’s skepticism acquired a sudden ubiquity 
as Pelagians crossed to Africa along with other Christians trying to make sense of the humiliation of their 
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recently “converted” empire. But even before 410 and long after, Augustine was also struggling with 
another problem, with a movement that had mushroomed during the previous century. 
 We have already been introduced to the Donatists. That they and Caecilianists turned parts of 
North Africa into a war zone is hardly beside the point, because Gregory concedes that the signs of that 
struggle in his man’s work somewhat undermine his own attempts to locate an “Augustinian civic 
liberalism” in late fourth- and early fifth-century Africa. In the late 380s, Augustine returned from Italy to 
find that Donatists outnumbered their rivals, who sensed they were under siege. Donatism originated as 
a protest against Caecilian and his “party” early in the fourth century. The Caecilianists were accused of 
having collaborated with persecutors or of having fraternized with known collaborators prior to 
Constantine’s conversion--and of cooperating with the government’s initiatives to suppress Donatism.  
To Augustine’s annoyance, the Donatists refused to listen to (his) reason. The Caecilianists’ leadership 
was tainted, they said, and Augustine, to take the higher ground, apparently exaggerated Donatists’ 
contempt for their competition. He gave history a distorted picture of a militantly puritanical sect and 
gave his admirers among political liberals with a prickly problem.  As we learned, Augustine eventually 
sanctioned legislation that amounted to intimidation to tip the balance in favor of Caecilianist or 
“catholic” Christianity in North Africa, concluding that shaking up Donatist secessionists was the best 
way to save them (Kaufman 2009). 
 Gregory joins “those who rightly abhor [Augustine’s] ‘loving’ pastoral logic of coercion” (Gregory 
2008, 302-303). Yet Gregory also--and astutely--appreciates that liberalisms, unlike idealisms, cannot 
transcend politics. Redistributions of resources and power that accommodate changing circumstances 
and answer to principles dear to liberals always require some coercion. To curb corruption, for instance, 
authorities may have to penalize bribe-makers and bribe-takers to deter their cronies. Gregory compiles 
an inventory of situations calling for coercion--for legislation against commodification of sex or against 
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drug abuse--and for regulations for financial markets or for environmental protection. “Any kind of 
liberalism,” he says, given its “commitment to individual liberty, is perpetually trying to justify the 
rationality of this coercive public order” (306). Hence, Augustinian liberals must not censure Augustine 
for having advocated governmental intervention as long as the authorities of his time deprived Donatists 
of their places for public worship, their other properties, and their liberty. But Augustine’s protest 
against proposals to deprive the most defiant Donatists of their lives saves liberals today from having to 
pitch him into the pits to prove their compassion for the underdog. Gregory nonetheless acknowledges 
that Augustinian liberals will have difficulty accepting the way Augustine had justified forms of coercion 
or “state intervention” now considered utterly unacceptable in some circles. Augustinian liberals, that is, 
accustomed to disconnecting love from force will have a “pressing problem” because their man 
definitely did not (299). 
 Contextualizing helps. Augustine believed he was protecting a coalition of churches--thus a 
catholic or universal church--against a regional, divisive, eccentric movement that could jeopardize the 
new faith’s privileged status. For the Donatists’ premise, making a virtue of secession, undermined 
Christianity itself. In paucis veritas, they declared; the few possessed the truth. Illogical, Augustine 
answered; that premise or principle would accredit every small fraction of any small faction--and 
endorse sects “divid[ing] the limbs of Christ” (Augustine 1909b, 480-81 3.66.75 - 3.67.76; Augustine 
2001, 177-78: epistle 185.8-9).  The secessionists resisted reassimilation, so their nemesis resisted the 
resistance.  And, alas, Donatist casualties have become the chief witnesses against Augustine’s 
Augustinian liberalism. 
 Gregory is right to dismiss criticism that goes over the top, decrying the bishop’s “hegemonic 
moralizing” and denouncing Christian cruelty (Gregory 2008, 299-300), but the problem remains: 
Augustine’s tough love no longer looks much like love. Augustine embarrasses liberals.  Gregory might 
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have pocketed some profit from the anti-Donatist treatises by connecting love to liberalism as they 
sometimes did.  For Augustine closely associated both with the Caecilianists--hatred and intolerance 
with Donatists.  Love is patient with sin to win sinners’ confidence, repentance and--ultimately--
reconciliation. Hatred and intolerance lead to secession and enduring enmity.  It was infinitely better, in 
Augustine’s judgment, to drive or coerce Christians into a church where charity was practiced, as a rule, 
than to leave them in the secessionists’ churches (or sects) where obsessions with purity obscured both 
the practice and rule of love (Augustine 1909a, 5: 1.3.4; Augustine 1909b, 385-86: 2.21.26).  
 Gregory seems to have missed that, yet he does not miss much. He combs Augustine’s works for 
statements and sentiments that service “an ethic of democratic citizenship” to inspire and inform an 
Augustinian liberal’s participation in politics today. To my mind, the results are more liberal than 
Augustinian, more liberal than Augustine’s results.  But Gregory’s book elucidates exceptionally well the 
issues prompting Christian realists, feminists, Rawlsian liberals, and their critics to ponder civic virtues 
and to sift the objectives of political participation.  The book’s best sentences on Augustine, I believe, 
speculate on “the sort of perfectionism [Augustine] encourages” and the connections between that 
encouragement and “the creativity of charity,” “enacting . . . love as a way of life and tirelessly 
reproaching oneself and one’s strategies for failing” to follow through (Gregory 2008, 313). 
 And that tireless reproach brings us back to Christian realism, specifically to the “anti-utopian 
imperative” Augustine was said to have formulated and Reinhold Niebuhr to have echoed.  Robin Lovin’s 
new study unsurprisingly places a “Niebuhrian emphasis on the persistence of evil in social and political 
life” at the base of what he describes as the antiutopian and counterapocalyptic realisms, which “keep 
expectations for human progress appropriately limited.” The latter less discreetly than the former, it 
seems, warns those who enthusiastically take up--or take up cudgels against--one or another political 
project “overestimate their own virtue” (Lovin 2008, 22).  Christian realists, ideally, should prevent 
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governments from “overreaching.” Lovin might just as well be aiming at Eric Gregory’s project as at 
idealists’ overconfidence when he settles on a realist’s raison d’etre,  reminding governments “what 
governments are for”: they “provide a limited justice, which makes people neither good nor loving” (30-
31). 
 Gregory’s devotion to “restore the primacy of love as crucial in remembering Augustine” has 
him hoisting overboard the “strict dichotomy” between justice and love, which, he explains, “seriously 
misleads any moral endeavor” (Gregory 2008, 377-78).  But Lovin’s realists of all stripes insist on 
retaining it. “[T]he first step toward a realistic Christian ethics,” he stipulates, “is to make a distinction 
between love and justice. This requires a recognition of the radical demands of love, which can be seen 
in Jesus’s imprudent and unreasonable commands.” That seems to put love out of politics and mandate 
“an appropriate lowering of expectations for justice” (Lovin 2008, 66). 
 Gregory’s Augustinian liberals occasionally do, yet sometimes do not, demand too much of 
justice and politics, depending on the page they occupy.  Lovin’s realists emphasize limits and low 
expectations rather than love. They contend that the idea of justice provides norms for a “distinctive 
sphere of life that is governed by different [and lower] expectations from those that mark the highest 
aspirations of personal life as a comprehensive achievement of human good” (67).  According to Lovin, 
Augustine’s City of God set the “spheres” for subsequent political theorists to ponder. It remains a 
“great theological study of history, philosophy, and politics”; its author was the “first great Christian 
realist” (46).  
 Lovin lavishes “great”s on his subject and on his subject’s subject, although Augustine’s line was 
that greatness (or glory)--here, now, and for the foreseeable--would not last. Glory, specifically, was 
overrated. Persons “wise by God’s standards” (Augustine 1972, 963: 20.30) must have learned from 
God’s revelations in their sacred texts how ill-equipped they were to bring about lasting peace and 
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genuine justice in their terrestrial cities. They were living though a long draught, but the good news was 
that their true home was celestial.  They were pilgrims in time, disinvested in what the rest of the world 
considered praiseworthy. And Christians’ “low expectations for their achievements in this world” attest 
their realism and piety (Lovin 2008, 49). 
 Do they therefore duck under political controversies? Neither Augustine nor Lovin consider(ed) 
avoidance a respectable alternative to engagement.  The former favored practicing “patient goodwill” 
and converting citizens by example, yet not by decree or by examples of political passion (Augustine 
2001, 36: ep. 138.11). Lovin has practitioners approach their responsibilities--as citizens or magistrates--
with “neither a religious ideal of social life nor a religious constitution,” but he commends “a system of 
unapologetic politics” (Lovin 2008, 220). 
 Not for Lovin, then, the prowess religiously-motivated political practitioners need to smuggle 
comprehensivist sentiments past Rawlsian liberals and into the public forum. He acknowledges that 
there is something to be said in favor of the Rawlsians’ desire to free “democratic politics” from religious 
fanaticism, but, much as Gregory does, Lovin senses a rather debilitating timidity behind Rawls’s rush to 
shield “reasoned argument” from religious piety. Is rationality such soft butter?  Might justice not be 
well served by prophetic witness? Think of the transparent ire of Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos! What 
might politics become if the passionately pious withdrew? If Christian realists checked their faith at the 
door and practiced politics dispassionately or perhaps apologetically, Lovin insinuates, “fundamental 
questions about society’s prevailing values” very rarely would get raised. The faithful would grow less 
faithful, more likely to fit in, he continues, than usefully to add to what, echoing Stephen Carter, he calls 
“the epistemic diversity” that enlivens and enriches public discussion. Lovin and Carter are as certain as 
Reinhold Niebuhr that Christian realists belong in the game. Lovin urges them to should stop trying to 
accommodate Ralwsian rules (and fears) and to practice politics unapologetically in both senses of that 
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term.  Their “unapologetic theology [ought to] express . . . no regrets for presenting itself in its own 
terms and [should] expect . . . to be understood” (122-26). 
 Lovin’s stand could be characterized as unapologetically prophetic--even as messianic.  Christian 
realism’s resolute opposition to “prevailing values” and currents approaches a near perfect, prophetic 
pitch when he puts into evidence “a rigorous religious ideal of identification with the poor.”  Gross 
inequalities tempt affluent, well-meaning members of society, Lovin says, to settle for “self-satisfied 
benevolence that takes pleasure in small donations” and “insulate[s]” donors from meaningful contacts 
with the destitute.  Unapologetic politics resists such “dilution” (along with arrogance and inflexibility, 
towards which prophetic witness tends) and searches for “concrete opportunities for social 
transformation” (131). Yet an unapologetic religious realist in Lovin’s drama has something of a 
messianic mission as well, because candor about Christian commitments not only has a chance to 
transform the tumbledown policies, which, in the example just mentioned, fail to change the ground 
rules, to redistribute resources significantly, and to end indigence. What is more important for the fate 
of politics itself--and, methodologically, a more far-reaching, high risk enterprise--such candor can save 
the public forum itself. Unapologetic theology, that is, fosters “a new kind of political realism that would 
reconnect . . . familiar governmental politics,” which ordinarily only looks after the most conspicuous 
casualties of market economies, “to the framework of a larger politics that seeks human goods” (145).  
Christian realists in public discussions, Lovin imagines, should teach their colleagues by example--
colleagues who are partisans of business or of the arts--to “make and answer claims upon one another” 
unapologetically (138). 
 Lovin does not write pretentiously and may detest the term “messianic,” yet he obviously thinks 
that Rawlsian liberals and secularists need rescuing from a rationalism, which is far too narrow.  Only 
when they welcome the religious realists’ “unapologetic assertion of comprehensivist ideas in the public 
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forum” will that forum truly be “open.” Only then will discussions there be frank.  Only then will the 
consensus reached be more spirited than sedative. What secularists see as confessional thrusting 
creates the “space” in which a pluralistic society can attend to competing interests and claims in terms 
that make sense to those who have and make them.  Possibly advocates of all stripes could do the job--
and less offensively to Rawlsian liberals, but Lovin nominates politically realistic partisans of religious 
traditions “because they form communities of people . . . shaped by an understanding of the human 
good and bear witness in the wider society to what that human good requires of all contexts” (148). So it 
is not too much of a stretch, I believe, to call Lovin’s turn-around of Rawls messianic? 
 Still, one can expect only small rewards from debates about terminology.  More important for 
the purpose of this paper is the fact that Lovin’s chapter on unapologetic “witness” does not refer to 
Augustine, leaving behind Lovin’s “first great Christian realist” as it sets some highly idealized 
preconditions for deliberative democracy. But Lovin’s Realism and New Realities argues that the public 
forum can indeed be redefined to resolve problems caused by those “new realities”--chief among them, 
pluralism and “the politics of interest”--and to prevent what Robert Hughes has memorably called “the 
fraying of America.” “Unless each context in a pluralistic society makes its own claims unapologetically,” 
says Lovin, we may find ourselves inhabiting the shell of a democracy while coping with “pluralistic 
totalitarianism” (151). 
 When she comes across Lovin’s new book, Kristen Deede Johnson may be surprised to learn that 
Augustine was omitted (evicted?) from the Christian realists’ prescriptions for engagement in a 
pluralistic society.  The late antique prelate was immensely helpful to her as she formulated advice to 
ethicists and to policymakers facing tensions created by competing interests in pluralistic societies. 
Augustine, after all, was no stranger to the “fraying” of African Christianity. The Donatists and Pelagians 
claimed to present more authentic versions of the Christianity they professed alongside leading 
22 
 
spokesmen for churches that came to be called “catholic.” Augustine had no illusion about what citizens 
of the celestial city could achieve as pilgrims in time. Peace, pro tempore, among warring interests was 
possible; lasting harmony here and now was not. Still, Augustine can be tremendously useful, Johnson 
avers, to the faithful struggling “to love, serve and live in the earthly cities”--to serve societies afflicted 
by a malignant doubt about its coherence when confronted with plural and rival interests--competing 
“loves and desires.” (Johnson 2007, 159-61). 
  Augustine was “cautious.” He knew that “the realization of the Heavenly City belongs to the age 
to come rather than to this age.” So pilgrims, who are citizens of their celestial city and resident aliens in 
terrestrial cities, “instead of trying to force the eschatological peace of the Heavenly City, can and 
should enjoy the peace of the earthly city as a good from God” (168). And not just enjoy peace, says 
Johnson, but they should promote and preserve it.  The faithful are “called to be involved,” even as 
magistrates--called to be “gentle and humble,” yet, on occasion, administering justice, they should be 
firm (171).  Johnson, thus far, values her asset, Augustine, as fairly as the other authors we have visited. 
She recalls his instructions for Christians in public service, but she eventually throws his caution--and 
caution--to the wind.  Presumably, Christian realists as well as Augustinian liberals could apparently 
learn from Augustine’s ontology and ecclesiology not just how to love, serve, and live in this plural, 
disordered world but also “how the diversity of creation can be reharmonized” (173). 
 To be fair, Johnson seldom crosses this bridge-too-far, setting aside her rather restrained 
Christian realism to pick up the lighter-weight and somewhat unrestrained ideas of some Augustinian(?) 
liberals. Before we pin down her confidence in the way Augustine provisions the political imagination to 
negotiate a route to reharmonization, however, we pause to reassess his alleged confidence that 
Christian magistrates might “reorder” “a people’s disordered loves and priorities”--then “subsume . . . 
under justice and love” the lust for domination that drives politics (163-65). Assuming exertion of that 
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sort, Johnson sweeps into the infield ably manned by Dodaro. Both refer to passages in Augustine’s City 
that supposedly monitor the changes one undergoes on becoming a Christian, descriptions that suggest 
magistrates may shed their eagerness for eminence as easily as a new-baptized philosopher discards 
“false teachings.” And Augustine has consoled himself briefly, identifying “the compulsion of love that 
undertakes righteous engagement in affairs” as an antidote to tyranny (Augustine 1972, 880: 19.19). 
 But he wrote there about motives, not about political maneuvers.  He placed service (in his 
example, church leadership) above status yet did not intimate that he had known about (or devised) any 
stash of specific strategies to hold off “pluralistic totalitarianism,” a disaggregation of civil conversation 
into sets of militantly maintained interests. Augustine’s City concedes that terrestrial cities cannot be 
ruled without rank or “high position.” Yet it also advises that such superiority tends to authorize a 
concomitant servitude that hardly complements Christianity’s witness to “the compulsion of love.” No 
additive to the political imagination--not even Christian theology--so shrivels the desires to dominate as 
to solve the problems of pluralistic societies (868-69: 19.12). 
 But Johnson, Gregory, Dodaro, and--to a lesser extent--Lovin, as we learned, think Augustine 
adds critically to the resources available to Christians attempting to address, liberally and realistically, 
the issues related to social and political dysfunction. Johnson places Augustine’s remarks on the celestial 
city--specifically, his encouraging words about that fraction of it in the church--at the center of current 
discussions about pluralism, contentious public discourse, and disharmony. The church, “embodied” and 
“practiced” Christianity, is that place where Christians try to be what they believe, and where 
“communication and action that occur in witness to the faith” create the sort of “mutuality” that Gerald 
Schlabach commends. Johnson exports it from the church into the public forum (Johnson 2007, 242-43). 
Once there, she presses Lovin’s and Gregory’s complaints about the inadequacy of Rawlsian liberal 
pieties. She welcomes discourses freighted with comprehensivist sentiments into that forum, and she 
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promises that they will yield “conversations rich and deep” (233). The exchanges “engage the current 
realities of pluralism on numerous levels and help foster a hospitable ethos of interaction” (238). Lovin 
would approve.  
 In the context of this review essay, Lovin and Johnson make a good team. They comb through 
the Christian tradition for sources for the “hospitable ethos of interaction” that is obviously dear to both 
of them. But, as we saw, Lovin’s chapter on unapologetic politics leaves Augustine in the shallows. 
Johnson takes him on board; Augustine charts the course of her argument that the church should be the 
model for useful, collegial deliberations in the public forum. His role in her book, however, raises a 
question that haunts my admiration for her work and for Gregory’s efforts to construct an “ethic of 
citizenship.” To what extent have the two reclaimed Augustine? Might the transfer of rules of discourse 
from the church to the “state” (to congressional subcommittees or town councils or multi-party talks on, 
say, disarmament) be, as Johnson implies, “the church’s political task,” in Augustine’s estimation as well 
as in hers?  That the church should “develop” “virtuous people, formed in a society built on trust rather 
than fear” seems a defensible proposition--and one Augustine would have defended. That the church 
should “equip” people “with the skills of discrimination that enable [them] to perceive and interpret the 
larger society (and its limitations)” (227) seems to hold as well. Johnson’s description of the challenge of 
developing the skills of discrimination draws on the work of Stanley Hauerwas, and I suspect that 
Augustine would endorse the result. But that either Augustine or Hauerwas would call the development 
of virtue “the church’s political task” is unlikely. Few disagree that “generosity toward those who are 
different” is the precondition for collegial conversations, which, conceivably, could lead to something 
approximating reciprocal understanding. Nonetheless, expect some defections, among Augustinians, if 
one marches “love, humility, hospitality, and grace” from churchyards to sites where intolerance, 
intimidation, and conflict usually rule and gives Augustine credit for inspiring the move (246-47). 
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 Johnson has words for and with others who care little about Augustine’s political legacy yet who 
object to transporting Christian virtues into the public forum. She scolds Rawlsian, secular liberals, much 
as Gregory does, because their faith in reason leaves “the moral duty of civility” and a concept of a 
public good sparsely defended (49-52).  She has few kind words for reason’s critics among post-
Nietzscheans, whose infatuation with difference, she says, places “the claims of individuality” and the 
need for constant “self-revision” above the desire for harmony (126-29). Augustine, moreover, has a 
horrid reputation among most post-Nietzscheans, who, Johnson and Gregory concur, unfairly have 
taken him as late antiquity’s impresario of intolerance (Gregory 2008, 299-300; Johnson 2007, 36-38). 
 That bad reputation is built largely on Augustine’s anti-Donatist treatises and correspondence, 
which leave admirers as well as critics cringing, although Johnson leaves the less generous side of 
Augustine underdescribed and holds that he conveys “the need to be more gentle,” “even if [his] 
conception of conversation is not quite as rich as the one we have been articulating” (Johnson 2007, 
245-46). On that count, one might quibble, inasmuch as Augustine’s conversations and concept of 
conversation do impress historians of rhetoric as rather rich. He likely learned from Ambrose of Milan 
how to reprimand firmly, benevolently, and effectively (Zauna 2005, 99-103).  But nothing will turn 
Augustine into the man who propped up the religious pluralism of his time.  I gather that he would have 
subscribed to Johnson’s timely advice that we should be “careful to prevent the church from grafting 
into its self-understanding ways of thinking that do not allow it to be seen as a site of true common 
good, around which people can be united in shared purpose as a commonwealth in which justice and 
peace are actual possibilities” (Johnson 2007, 223-24). But, to repeat,  I cannot imagine him agreeing to 
accompany Johnson as she crosses from the churches, where people “come together united through 
Christ in such a way that their differences do not become ultimate, nor their political identities decisive” 
to the public forum where those political identities are decisive (254). 
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 Augustine’s instructions on that count were clear. “Mark the contrasts,” he said, between the 
terrestrial and celestial cities. The chief challenge for the celestial city on pilgrimage in time was survival 
in rough seas--in hoc saeculo maligno, in this wicked world (Augustine 1972, 643 and 761-62: 15.26 and 
18.1).  Citizens of the celestial city were not to forget that they were pilgrims whose work--as menials, 
magistrates, and emperors--was, in essence, grief work. The City of God was a reminder, a disorienting 
device for those who grew too comfortable in time, too confident in tactics aimed to improve public 
policy, too invested in the fate of their estates, too hopeful. Fidgeting with and fussing over 
inconsequentials, the concrete yet impermanent, they missed their calling. When Augustine told the 
faithful among his readers to “rejoice only in expectation,” he was referring to their coming home to 
heaven (831: 18.49).3 
 As Gregory reminds us, Augustine’s disenchantment with their impermanent places on earth 
was neither “total” nor “final” (Gregory 2008, 361).  It is possible for interpreters of his City to stable 
some of his ideas--especially, the ones that I feature--and to run with others. Augustinian liberals 
understandably try to pry from his ontology, ecclesiology, soteriology, and pastoral counsels something 
that makes for a make-over of political discourse or political theology. As long as liberals admit that the 
“something” is not “a blueprint for life in the earthly city,” to borrow Johnson’s terms (Johnson 2007, 
198-99), they--as she--close companionably with the Christian realists. Johnson seems sometimes to 
massage hopes that Augustine might help us reform political discourse and deliberations, yet, at other 
times, she modestly looks only to “move us a little closer to humbly and charitably engaging and 
reconciling  . . . rather than tolerating, ignoring, or indiscriminatorily celebrating our differences” (176). 
Augustinian liberalism gets out of hand when, pursuing progressive justice, it enlists the late antique 
prelate in attempts to make civic virtues and liberal values epidemic and to accomplish its mission 
civilisatrice. Ian Buruma’s observation--that “eventually such missions always come to grief leaving ruins 
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where they meant to build utopias”--sounds very Augustinian (Buruma 2003, 6), if only because, on such 
missions, arrogance easily overtakes benevolence. 
 To historians, ethicists, theologians, and political scientists interested in “applied Augustine,” his 
unforgettable warning against arrogance may seem appropriate here as a conclusion. When the 
Pelagians spread the word that grace received in baptism so reconfigured Christians’ desires that they 
might proceed from that point unaided by grace to earn salvation unaided by grace, Augustine 
answered that baptism only starts what can never be completed in time (renovatio incipit). Human 
infirmities remained in force (Augustine 1913, 79-80: 2.7.9).  In time, the body and--presumably, by 
extension--the body politic were under the influence of discreditable impulses.  As Gregory says, 
“Augustine’s frequent pilgrimage imagery of the journey to our homeland,” together with the idea of  
sin’s lasting stain, can undermine an “ethics of citizenship” by imparting “the sense that the neighbor is 
merely a temporary vehicle for the individual’s journey to eternal beatitude” (Gregory 2008, 337). Fair 
enough! One can so stress the viator theme in Augustine’s works, his love for God, sense of sin, and 
eschatology to make everything else--civic virtue, friendship, and love for neighbor--seem instrumental 
or, worse, bumps in the road. Yet his City of God lends some support to that end. It musters battalions 
of examples of injustices, indifference to social justice, and general decadence, which discredit Rome’s 
political idealists (Curbelié 2004, 411-25; Curbelié 2007, 20-24). And it devalues what political theorists 
and ordinary citizens had heralded as vera via, “the true way,” distinguished public service, which 
earned political practitioners popularity and glory. For Augustine, theirs was the wrong way.  Even if 
civic virtues were diligently practiced enroute and self-interest (privatas res) was sacrificed for the 
common good (pro re communi . . . contempserunt).  That vera via ought not to be mistaken for piety. It 
was politics. Augustine’s City, marking the contrasts, as noted, strives to tidy up those two categories 
(Augustine 1972, 204-205 and 1065-66: 5.15 and 22.22). 
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 He was not always that tidy, but he discovered in Milan that politics and truth had gone their 
separate ways. He was at the emperor’s Court, among the top-floor bureaucrats, an orator-for-hire, 
angling for a government appointment, editing and broadcasting clients’ reputations, one of the best 
flatterers in the business, when he conceded that flattering was falsifying and that everyone around him 
knew as much. He denounced politics as a pack of lies, in effect, reducing praise for progress and for 
justice to the status of lies told to advance the clients’ interests (Lepelley 1987, 112-13). 
 So, in 386, Augustine strayed from what colleagues in politics considered the vera via. He 
started down a different path and, much later, measured the distance between the two in terms that he 
thought corresponded with contrasts introduced by that “wisest of men [who] devoted the whole of this 
book [Ecclesiastes] to pointing out this vanity, obviously with the sole intention that we should long for 
that life which is not made up of vanity under this sun, but of verity under the sun’s creator” (Augustine 
1972, 899: 20.3). When cradled in those contrasts--vanity versus verity; politics versus piety--the routes 
they signify seem worlds apart, which Augustine--on pastoral rounds--surely knew was not the case. But 
he usually wrote as if they were. We, too, know the routes, politics and piety, crisscross, but 
downloading Augustine into realists’ and liberals’ endeavors to make a difference, politically, to control 
the traffic along those two routes and improve the conversation at intersections, is tricky.  The realists’ 
restrained hopes for progressive justice and liberals’ search for a consensus or conversation that 
encompasses respect for difference typically take Augustine’s hopes for souls as hopes for society. 
 Given the political disintegration around him, which the very concept of late antiquity hides 
from us (Ward Perkins 2006), Augustine’s perspectives on the conflicts plaguing Christianity as well as 
the Court and empire might fall in line behind those of agonistic political theorists who, Charles 
Mathewes aptly puts it, “picture reality as an archipelago of alterities” (Mathewes 2007, 267), although 
he has Augustine heading down a different path (276-77). Still, at times, the prelate’s pessimism bulges 
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from the City, as when he compares public officials to thieves (Augustine 1972, 139: 4.4). That 
comparison, unless the ablative absolute introducing it--remota justitia--is read as a temporary 
condition rather than as an essential characteristic of both larceny and political leadership, betrays 
Augustine as utterly staatsskeptisch (Horn 2007, 61-64; Kaufman 2007, 229-30).      
 Such a conclusion does not preclude his banking into turns that would put Augustine among 
ethicists and higher-flying social reformers of our time, and the evidence shows his seemingly sincere 
interests in improving the lot of the destitute, enslaved, and death-row inmates (Lepelley 2006, 213-14). 
Of course, his skepticism about “the state” and his social concern do not necessarily strike each other 
from historians’ ledgers, but they do make it difficult to get the sums right. Had Augustine been more 
politically transparent, his ideas could be tracked more easily. Still, it suits that untidiness remains, 
because, were it otherwise, applications of his thinking (and faith) to the problems posed by pluralism in 
democratic societies possibly would not have tested to such good results the intelligences of our four 
authors. The results may not pass the tests of every historical theologian, but they enrich conversation 
among historians, ethicists, theologians, and political scientists.  
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1  The problem most often cited in studies of such tensions is that of Christian magistrates obliged to torture 
witnesses as well as the accused to get to the truth. Augustine counsels judges to bear with the system yet to pray 
for their deliverance from its more onerous and morally dubious tasks (Augustine 1972, 859-61: 19.6). Charles 
Mathewes discusses the tension in terms of two “ought”s: politics, Mathewes writes, purportedly channeling 
Augustine, is “an inescapable mode of life in which we ought to be engaged until the eschaton [with the purpose 
of minimizing its corrosive effects on character], but it is not one [mode of life] we ought to enjoy” (Mathewes 
2007, 192).  Augustine’s episcopal colleagues had little choice about engagement; Emperor Constantine created 
diocesan courts or “audiences,” turning bishops into magistrates. And thereafter, they were “neck deep in the 
treachery of human society,” says Kevin Uhalde in his insightful study of the “expectations of justice” in late 
antiquity (Uhalde 2007, 136-37).  Kaiko Raikas thinks that the development was welcomed as an opportunity to 
expand episcopal jurisdiction and influence (Raikas 1997, 476-78).  Claude Lepelley, however, suggests that 
bishops, wary of antagonizing pagans in public administration, had little interest in capitalizing on opportunities 
that brought pagans as litigants into their courts (Lepelley 2001, 391). 
   
2  Augustine conceives of justice as a personal virtue alongside temperance, prudence, and courage (Augustine 
1972, 535: 13.21; Horn 2007, 62-63). And, as Philippe Curbelié reminds us, he did not think that, on that personal 
level, the virtues could be perfectly realized. The completion of justification was to be anticipated (in spe), not 
accomplished (in re). Much the same applied to Augustine’s hopes for social justice. On that count, Curbelié 2004, 
290-91 refers to Augustine’s eschatological orientation. Paul Weithman’s version of Augustinian liberalism appears 
somewhat more compatible with that orientation and, I believe, with Christian realism, albeit a less “robust” 
liberalism than Gregory’s. Weithman 1999, 313 plumps for the formation of “habitual restraints on the desire to 
dominate.” Gregory 2008, 96-99 thinks this too timid. An Augustinian liberalism that cannot overturn the standard 
view of Augustine’s political pessimism, he insists is neither Augustinian nor sufficiently liberal. Unable to forestall 
such criticism, Weithman 1999, 318 nonetheless landed a blow before Gregory took him on. It is almost as if he 
had foreseen Gregory’s objections: “Christians must conclude that Augustinian liberalism is a politics with limited 
ambitions,” Weithman says, “It does not claim . . . that the mutual respect liberalism engenders comes to some 
fruition in a Christian love of neighbor.” 
 
3  Charles Mathewes raises three directly relevant questions, answering the first superbly and economically, in the 
same sentence that asks it. “How should we inhabit authority in order best to remind ourselves that we undertake 
that inhabitation in fear and trembling, and to signal to others that we recognize the difference between the office 
we occupy and the person we are” (Mathewes 2007, 186)?  The two conditions, translated into adverbs, 
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“tentatively” and “humbly,” capture the spirit of Augustine’s likely response to the “how to,” but Mathewes’s 
phrases are spot on. The second and third questions, “how a hopeful politics can be civically mobilizing, while still 
disconsoling political expectations” and “how more fully to inhabit” hope (241) give Augustinian liberals and 
Christian realists plenty of room to maneuver. Hope, after all, can be despair’s close companion and have us racing 
from this hopelessly wicked world into the church as sanctuary, even to heaven as a place where the promises, on 
which hope feeds, will be fulfilled. But hope can also “fund engagement,” as Mathewes says and “generate the 
sort of anger necessary for real change now” (238). Schlabach looks to favor the first, as do I, although I would not 
identify the church as the only or most promising place that hope can develop into compassion and ameliorative 
action. Dodaro, Gregory, Lovin, and Johnson seem to favor “a hopeful politics [that] can be civically mobilizing.”        
